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of sabotage, it highlights and prompts the need for extensive
research, methodologies, new tools and models of security to
safeguard these critical infrastructures.
One prominent feature in CPSs is that embedded computers and communication networks govern both physical
manifestations and computations. This, in turn, affects how
the two primary infrastructures interact with each other, and
the outside world. From a functionality point of view, a CPS
can be regarded as the intersection of properly built individual
(cyber, physical, network) components. This unfortunately, is
not the case in terms of security. Treating CPS security in a
disjoint manner, allows unintended information ﬂow.
Access control based methods and information ﬂow based
methods are the two primary approaches to system security
policies and mechanisms. From a conﬁdentiality standpoint,
the problem in CPSs is that certain aspects of the physical
portion are always observable. As a side effect, explicit
information ﬂow violations take place as externally observable
physical manifestations divulge sensitive system settings [3].
Such derived knowledge coupled with the system semantics
can be used against the system as integrity and availability
attacks. Unfortunately, access control-based security models
fail to prevent propagation [4]; they cannot control how the
data will be used after been read. A viable alternative is to use
ﬂow-based security models such as information ﬂow security
enforcement mechanisms.
Even within the information ﬂow enforcement domain, only
a handful (if not none) of work is done towards CPS security.
CPS security needs to be considered at the system level [5].
Earlier developments in enforceable security properties were
strictly based on safety properties [6]. The safety property
requirement is too strong for CPS security analysis and prevents Information Flow Security Properties (IFPs) from being
enforced and monitored [7]. However, unwinding theorembased security automata can be designed to capture possibilistic future execution sequences by not having to detect
violations at present, but eventually sometime in future [8].
This allows IFPs to be enforced and monitored outside the
Alpern-Schneider framework [9].
This paper presents an event compensation based gen-

Abstract—This paper presents a general theory of event
compensation as an information ﬂow security enforcement mechanism for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). The fundamental
research problem being investigated is that externally observable
events in modern CPSs have the propensity to divulge sensitive
settings to adversaries, resulting in a conﬁdentiality violation.
This is a less studied yet emerging concern in modern system
security. A viable method to mitigate such violations is to use
information ﬂow security based enforcement mechanisms since
access control based security models cannot impose restrictions
on information propagation. Further, the disjoint nature of
security analysis is not appropriate for systems with highly
integrated physical and cyber infrastructures. The proposed
compensation based security framework is foundational work
that uniﬁes cyber and physical aspects of security through the
shared semantics of information ﬂow. A DC circuit example is
presented to demonstrate this concept.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Preserving the conﬁdentiality of sensitive actions/events
is a vital aspect of modern system security. By uncovering
sensitive actions, adverse parties can identify the crucial components of a system and target speciﬁc attacks. Numerous
integration levels within modern systems can be broadly
categorized into two domains: a cyber infrastructure (computations, control algorithms, decision engines, databases, etc.) and
a physical infrastructure (physical processes and components,
links and connections, etc.). Commonly known as CyberPhysical Systems (CPSs), such systems are put together to
provide better resource utilization, control, fault tolerance and
performance [1].
The proper functionality of CPSs has direct impact on the
nations’ economic and social stability. In August 2003, an estimated 50 million people in the Midwest and Northeast portions
of the United States and Ontario, Canada were affected by a
power outage lasting up to 4 days [2]. Although this event
was triggered by a cascading failure in power lines loosely
coupled with a cyber failure, rather than an intentional act
This work was supported in part by the Future Renewable Electric Energy
Distribution Management Center; a National Science Foundation supported
Engineering Research Center, under grant NSF EEC-0812121 and NSF CSR
award CCF-0614633, and in part by the Missouri S&T Intelligent Systems
Center.
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on petri nets, process algebra and program logic, etc., tend
to be too imprecise; a static enforcer can potentially reject a
program based on a partial analysis [12].
Conceptually, runtime enforcement monitors work by monitoring the computational steps of untrusted programs and
intervening whenever execution is about to violate the security
policy being enforced [13]. The earliest threshold on Execution
Monitoring (EM) enforceable security policies was established
in [6] by stating that only safety properties can be enforced
using a monitoring mechanism. A büchi-like security automata
enforced security policies by terminating the target execution
upon detecting a violation. Flow-based security properties
are not safety properties [7, 14] and the safety requirement,
unfortunately, precludes these from being enforced. For these
properties, the decision to terminate an execution can not be
purely based on a detected violation on a single execution [7].
Extending the security automata [8, 11] implemented with
monitors [15] can enforce non-safety properties.

eralized framework to enforce IFPs in CPSs. The idea is
to compensate the observable effect of a (potentially information ﬂow violating) system event by pairing it up with
an appropriate reaction event(s). By executing compensating
events in a timely (i.e. within a certain time period) and
coordinated manner, the expected net observable change is
either insigniﬁcant in terms of deducing sensitive information
or equivalent to some other system characteristic(s). Thus, the
objective is to obfuscate the observable effects of a system∗ .
In this respect, the contributions of this work are,
• Introduce a class of system properties called P–
compensate properties which are execution monitoring
enforceable in cyber-physical systems
• Develop a semantic model to analyze conﬁdentiality
violation in cyber-physical systems
• Extend previous work on runtime enforceable policies
by combining a predicate mechanism with the ability to
inject events
• Extend existing enforcement mechanisms beyond the
safety property requirements by proposing an event compensation based security framework
The work in this paper extends previous work in [3] by
presenting a precise system characteristic, the P–Compensate
Property, required for compensation. The observability analysis in [10] is also extended beyond series and parallel
connections to a “mix network”. Further, the applicability of
the compensation concept to protect Nondeducibility security
in CPSs is presented.
Section II lists some of the recent work in enforcing
information ﬂow security policies. Section III introduces the
proposed framework. The applicability of the proposed work
on a CPS is presented in Section IV. Section V presents the
correlation between the inherent external observability and
the resulting deducibility in CPSs and Section VI shows how
compensation can protect Nondeducibility security in a CPS.
Section VII lists the conclusion of this work.

III. T HE F RAMEWORK
The proposed work of this article improves EM security
automata [6] by combining it with an emulator [8] and the
event insertion capability of the edit automata [15]. Unlike the
traditional “conservative” approach† , the framework proposed
here employs a more optimistic event compensation based
enforcement mechanism ES .
Event compensation is only applicable to executions which
are eligible for cleansing. Cleansing an execution allows it to
extend beyond a violation point and prevent it from being
discarded. An edit automata [15], which can modify the
behavior of an execution during runtime (with suppression and
injection), is a good example of execution cleansing.
Only a certain class of qualiﬁed executions can be extended
in this manner. Suppose there exists an execution σ with a
distinctly identiﬁable violation point σj , a valid preﬁx σ[. . . i]
and a projected postﬁx σ[k . . .]. The optimistic assumption is
that, in the absence of σj , the execution maintains property
P. This is similar in concept to the suppression operation
introduced in [15]. Formally, this characteristic can be denoted
as,

II. R ELATED W ORK
Information ﬂows between processes which are not supposed to communicate should be prevented in multilevel
security systems. In other words, the ability to deduce sensitive high-level domain (DH ) information at a low-level
domain (DL ) is an information ﬂow security violation. The
sensitivity of information and the “communication” depend
on each processes’ view of the system. The term “deduce”
is a generalization for different ways information ﬂow security can be compromised. Fundamental IFPs introduced
over the years such as Noninterference, Noninference and
Nondeducibility [11] attempt to characterize and capture these
“possibilistic” ﬂows.
Information ﬂow property enforcement is two fold: static
compile time enforcement and runtime enforcement. Compile
time enforcers such as secure-type systems, mechanisms based

σ = σ[. . . i] σj σ[k . . .] =⇒ σ[. . . i] σ[k . . .] ∈ (P ∈ PS∗ )
(1)
Executions similar in form to (1) are eligible for cleansing
under the proposed enforcement scheme. Mathematically, this
allows correction action(s) to be injected immediately after
σj and extend the execution. However, in order to maintain
the desired P, such an injection needs to compensate for
the effects of σj . By performing event compensation, ES
restores the system back to an operational state. Thus, such an
optimistic view of the system is also a liveness [9] feature.
A. P–Compensate Property
This work quantiﬁes an execution step as a ﬁnite sequence
of controlled state transitions. By doing so, ES is empowered
† The security automata in [6] for example takes a conservative approach
by immediately terminating executions

∗ This is not to be confused with obfuscating actual physical actions which
no amount of compensation can reverse
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to inject more than one correction action, depending on the
requirement and the speciﬁc property expected to maintain.

•

With respect to a IFP P, the effect of executing a compensating couple needs to be null, i.e., φci − φci−1 =  .
The second event of the pair, φci , needs to lead the state
machine back to an information ﬂow secure state as well
ˆ is
as compensate for the ﬁrst event φci−1 . The predicate ℘()
used to make sure that each compensating transition adheres
to the particular property P in concern. This enables the
compensation automata to maintain P–compensating property
during each “compensating” step of the execution. Thus,

Deﬁnition 1. [Compensation Sequence] For some identiﬁable
execution violation point σj ∈ σ, a compensation sequence
ς ∈ Σ∗ is deﬁned as a ﬁnite sequence of states starting with
σj which can compensate for σj for some property P.
σ[. . . i] σ[k . . .] = σ[. . . i] ς σ[k . . .]
where, ς ∈ Σ∗ , ς = σ[j . . .]
Consequently, associated with ς is a ﬁnite sequence of
compensating actions ϕ = < φcj , φcj+1 , . . . , φck > ∈ Φ∗ corresponding to each state transition in ς. Thus, a compensated
execution takes the following form.
φcj

φcj+1

ϕ

ˆ
. . i] −
→ σk )
∀j, ¬℘(σ[.
ˆ
. . i]σj [k . . .]) =⇒ ℘(σ[.

(3)

As a side effect of the characteristic equation 2, ϕ steps
through a sequence of insecure states; certain intermediate
states of every ς can momentarily violate P. However, the
argument is that ς is ﬁnite by deﬁnition and ϕ is executed in
a timely and controlled manner to avoid external observations.
Thus, the effect of the inherent security vulnerability is temporary. Further, each event in a compensating sequence needs to
be from the secure domain, i.e., ∀φci ∈ ϕ, φci  DH . A detailed
technical speciﬁcation of compensation automata is found at
[3].

φk

σ[. . . i] −→ σj −−−→ σj+1 . . . −→ σ[k . . .]
where, ς ∈ Σ∗ , ς = σ[j . . .]
Once an eligible execution is identiﬁed, a compensation sequence is calculated to compensate for σj . This is done by
carefully calculating a ϕ which can lead the overall system
back to a safe state with respect to the IFP P. The compensativeness of a system characterizes the ability to cleanse
executions respect to some P.
[3] formally showed the potential of event compensation to
preserve IFPs in a CPS. Even though there is a momentarily
lapse in the corresponding feature, the compensated execution
as a whole would still adhere to the desired P. The idea is
that the system as a whole, not individual operations, need to
satisfy the required property.

IV. A PPLICATION : S MART G RID
The emerging “Smart Grid” improves the power grid reliability using a Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS)
network. FACTS devices are reconﬁgurable/reprogrammable
power electronic devices which can change speciﬁc transmission line parameters [16]. Each FACTS device has a set
of transmission lines (and buses) under its control. In the
case of a failure, these devices recalculate the overall power
redistribution and change line parameters accordingly. The
exact change applied on a particular line(s) is calculated using
a distributed control algorithm by communicating with other
FACTS devices in the network. This way, the overall power
balance of the network is properly maintained.

Deﬁnition 2. [P–Compensate Property] A system is compensative with respect to a property P ∈ PS if and only if,
for some execution σ with an identiﬁable violation point at j,
there exists a compensation sequence ς.
∃σ ∈ Σ∗ , σ ∈ P : ¬℘(σ[.
ˆ
. . j]),
∃ς ∈ Σ∗ : ς = σ[j . . .], σ[. . . i] ς σ[k . . .] ∈ P

D is the set of security domains

(2)

B. Compensating Couple [3]
In the most basic form, ς consists of a single element and
two associated actions, i.e., | ϕ | = 2. This is formally deﬁned
as a compensating couple. With this, the security automata
[6] can be extended to a compensation automata as follows.
The state space Q is divided into two sets. W ⊆ Q is the
set of information ﬂow safe states and U ⊆ Q is the set of
vulnerable(unsafe) states.
Deﬁnition 3 (Compensation Automata). The compensation
automata consists of 6-tuples (Q, Q0 , I, δ, W, D) where,
• Q is a set automaton states
• Q0 is a set of initial states for the automaton Q0 ⊆ Q
c
c
• I ⊆ Φ is a set of input symbols of the form (φi−1 , φi ) :
c
c
(φi−1 , φi ∈ I)
Q
• δ is the a state transition function δ : Q × I → 2
speciﬁed under a predicate ℘()
ˆ
• W is a set of ﬁnal states W ⊆ Q

Fig. 1.

A 13-Bus Test Feeder with a FACTS device

Figure 1 is a 13-bus test feeder with a FACTS device
installed. The smart grid, in fact, can be regarded as the
composition of numerous similar blocks.
In terms of security, it is important to maintain the conﬁdentiality of each FACTS device’s setting. If an adversary
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Table I is the corresponding DL observation matrix for the
network in Figure 3. A DL observation matrix lists changes in
observations for each DH action. Changes to variable resistors
are denoted by ↑ and ↓ arrows.

can derive the overall state of the system, such knowledge
can be used to identify the most critical and vulnerable
links(transmission lines) of the network. Such cognition can
be used against the power grid not only in the form of physical
attacks, but also to force erroneous FACTS settings [16];
the system state may divulge sensitive operational limitations
along with the present status of both FACTS devices and
transmission lines.
A. Modeling the FACTS network as a DC Circuit
For the simplicity of analysis, the different interconnections
of the FACTS network is compared to a DC circuit as shown
in Figure 2. The ability of a FACTS device to change active
power within a transmission line is similar to the capability of
a variable resistor in a DC circuit. The operational limitations
of a FACTS device are modeled by bounded power ﬂow
changes (±20%).

Fig. 3. A Network of Five Reconﬁgurable/Reprogrammable Units in a Mix
Connection Network

V. C ORRELATION BETWEEN O BSERVABILITY AND
D EDUCIBILITY

Each row is an execution σ. Column 1 is the trace ζ and
columns 2–6 is the projection ρ. Here is an example.

The amount of sensitive information a single observer can
deduce is different from what a set of collaborative observers
can deduce. The strategic placement of observers is signiﬁcant
since readings from certain observers might turn out to be
redundant. The relationship between the deducibility and the
observability is an important aspect of CPS security analysis.
[10] evaluated the minimum number of observers required
to fully derive all DH commands in pure series and pure
parallel connected networks. A similar evaluation on a network
with series and parallel connections (mix connection network)
resulted in Lemma 1 below.

σ = {RE ↑, IA ↓, IB ↑, IC ↓, ID ↑, IE ↓}
ζ(σ) = {RE ↑}
ρ(σ, DL ) = {IA ↓, IB ↑, IC ↓, ID ↑, IE ↓}
The objective of DL observers is to uncover ζ (secret DH
settings) purely based on observed ρ. A single observer has
less capability to do this due to his limited view of the system.
For example, ρ of observerx in the second column of Table
I lists that an increase in current ﬂow could be due to any
of RA ↑, RB ↑, RC ↑ or RD ↑. Thus, observerx cannot
distinguish the exact command.
DL Observation
DH Change
RA
RB
RC
RD
RE
RA
RB
RC
RD
RE

Fig. 2.
The General Form of a Mix Connected Network of Reconﬁgurable/Reprogrammable Units

Lemma 1. [Minimum Number of Observers for Mix Connection Networks] A mix connected network with η number
of reconﬁgurable units and κ number of junctions can be fully
deduced with a minimum of η − κ number of observers.

↑
↑
↑
↑
↑
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓

IA

IB

IC

ID

IE

↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↑
↑
↑
↑
↑

↓
↓
↑
↑
↑
↑
↑
↓
↓
↓

↓
↑
↓
↓
↓
↑
↓
↑
↑
↑

↓
↑
↓
↓
↑
↑
↓
↑
↑
↓

↓
↑
↓
↑
↓
↑
↓
↑
↓
↑

TABLE I
T HE L OW LEVEL OBSERVATION MATRIX FOR THE NETWORK IN F IGURE 3

In contrast, a set of collaborating DL observers can build
unique projections, ρ, corresponding to each ζ. As evident
in Table I, there is a unique ρ for each of the 10 possible
ζs. In fact, it is possible to show that a minimum of three
observers can fully deduce this sample network by solving
KCL equations for junctions X and Y .

Lemma 1 results from progressively extending the general
form of a mix connection network with the basic building
block shown in Figure 2. As an example, Figure 3 shows a
network of ﬁve conﬁgurable units, after inserting one basic
building block.
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Basic Building
Blocks

Reconﬁgurable
Units

Junctions

Minimum
num. of
Observers

0
1
2
..
.

3
5
7
..
.

1
2
3
..
.

2
3
4
..
.

n

3+2×n

n−1

n+2

Also, from the contrapositive of Lemma (1), any number of
external observers below the minimum requirement can only
partially deduce the system. Event compensation achieves this
by obfuscating DL observations. These characteristics of the
system are formalized in the following two Corollaries.
Corollary 1. [Partially P–Compensatable Mix Connection
Networks with Range Limited Changes] Mix connected
networks of reconﬁgurable units with range limited changes
are partially P–compensatable.

TABLE II
T HE L OW LEVEL OBSERVATION MATRIX FOR THE NETWORK IN F IGURE 3

Corollary 2. [Partially P–Compensatable Mix Connection
Networks] Mix connected networks of reconﬁgurable units are
partially P–compensatable.

Table II shows the relationship between the number of
conﬁgurable units and the junctions. This was done by repeating the experiment with different number of basic building
blocks. As a consequence, Lemma 1 can be easily proven
using mathematical induction.
The result of this experiment is signiﬁcant since it shows a
violation of DH command conﬁdentiality due to DL observations. In terms of IFPs, this is a violation of Nondeducibility
security.

A. Contribution of the Event Compensation on CPS Security
Having multiple crossing points for a particular observation
gives ES more options to select different action-correction
pairs to prevent externally observable changes. For a state
machine abstraction, this allows executions to be extended in
multiple possible paths. For example, ϕ = < RA ↑, RC ↓> or
ϕ́ = < RC ↑, RA ↓>, as in Figure 4(c), can be used to nullify
changes in IC . With this, the system becomes nondeterministic
for DL observers; absence of DL observations does not reﬂect
absence of DH changes.
Even detected changes could be due to one of the several
possible DH action couples (ϕ or ϕ́ above). On top of that is
the possibility of physical layer failures and interrupts. This
is an important feature since it removes the uniqueness of
DL observations. As a consequence, such a system preserves
Nondeducibility of conﬁdential DH actions[3, 10].
Equally important is the ability to recover the system from
a possible failure. Having multiple possible compensating
couples empowers DH administrators when committing to a
DH command. Administrators can calculate corrections for
each DH command and use a compensating automata to
enforce proper execution.

VI. N ONDEDUCIBILITY–C OMPENSATE P ROPERTY FOR
CPS S
Theorem 1. [P–Compensate Property for CPSs] A System
of reconﬁgurable units with a multiplicity of non-deducible
combinations has the P–compensate property
By deﬁnition, multiplicity in projections preserves Nondeducibility [7]. With that, consider the following two executions.
σ1 = {RA ↑, IA ↓, IB ↓, IC ↓, ID ↓, IE ↓}
σ2 = {RB ↑, IA ↓, IB ↓, IC ↑, ID ↑, IE ↑}
Technically, there is a potential that these two commands
acting together may cancel out certain DL observations, because IC , ID and IE show opposite changes. The net observation resulting from conducting two simultaneous changes in
RA and RC is shown in Figure 4.
The points at which the vertical axis crosses the horizontal
axis (crossing points) in each subﬁgure of Figure 4 represent


and RC
values where the correspondthe combination of RA
ing current reading is equivalent to the initial steady state
value. This is a signiﬁcant factor because at these values,
there is no externally observable change. Thus, Theorem 1 is
instantiated to Nondeducibility–compensate property because
of the multiplicity in ρ; any two executions which include
crossing points for a particular current reading have equivalent
DL projections.
The crossing points correspond to a particular compensating
couple in the proposed framework. However, only a limited
number of DH events have corresponding compensating couples. This is a physical constraint of the system itself. Thus,
not all DH actions have corresponding corrections.

VII. C ONCLUSIONS
This work formally shows how event compensation based
IFPs can preserve conﬁdentiality of actions in CPSs. The
central concept in applying event compensation is to obfuscate
external observations resulting from a conﬁdential DH action
using two or more compensating actions. Even though the
operational constraints of a system may still leave certain
DH actions exposed to external observation based deduction,
the proposed work is an improvement over existing security
models and a starting point for innovative future system
security policies. The ability to compensate at least one DL
observation may still prove vital in preventing information
ﬂow from DH to DL . Such compensation removes some
aspects of the domain knowledge required by DL observers
to identify and distinguish DH changes.
Future work expects to extend and verify the proposed
framework in an actual CPS – the smart grid.
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Fig. 4.

(a) The Net Effect of Changing RA and RC on IA

(b) The Net Effect of Changing RA and RC on IB

(c) The Net Effect of Changing RA and RC on IC

(d) The Net Effect of Changing RA and RC on ID

The Net Effect of Changing RA and RC Simultaneously has on the Corresponding Changes in the Current Readings of the Network in Figure 3
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